BROCHURE

6th Munich-Berlin Graduate Workshop in Ancient Philosophy

Organized by
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**14:00–open end**: Meet & greet
The Relationship between Shape and Final Cause in *Met. Z.17*

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Aristotelian forms are sometimes identified as the “shape” of the compounds they belong to, other times as their “final cause”. These two concepts, however, are very different from each other, and it is unavoidable to wonder what their reciprocal relation is supposed to be. In *Metaphysics Z.17*, by introducing the causal-explanatory model from the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle might be seen as offering a clear answer to this question.

In the first part of my talk, I will argue that a specific passage from *A.Po. II.8* might be crucial to understand how this explanatory model is at work in *Met. Z.17* and how the final cause and shape of compounds are related to each other. The concepts of “final cause” and “shape”, I will argue, are so closely connected that Aristotle could subsume them under one general meaning: the final cause is what directly explains the specific conformation (“shape”) of some matter, and, conversely, the specific conformation of some matter is the visible manifestation of a certain final cause. However, according to this model, it is also clear that the form as “shape” is not what really is substance, but that only the form as “final cause” is.

In the second part of my talk, I wish to show how this reading of the relation between shape and final cause fits with (and sheds some light on) what Aristotle says in *Met. H.2* about the relation between “substance” and the “differences” of matter (where these differences should be understood as the “shape” that figures in Z.17). A further passage from *De Partibus Animalium I.1* confirms this reading of H.2 and of the relation between shape and final cause that I will defend.
What moves or is moved in virtue of something else?

The ‘proper subjects’ in Aristotle’s Physics VIII, 4

Giulia Clabassi, HU Berlin, giulia.clabassi@hu-berlin.de

There is currently no established consensus among scholars on the interpretation of Aristotle’s account of animal self-motion. On the one hand, in his natural philosophy, he calls animals “self-movers” because they possess the principle of motion and rest καθ’ αὐτὰ (“in virtue of themselves”). On the other hand, as many scholars have pointed out, in Phys. VIII (259b10-12) Aristotle seems to contradict his own definition and locate their principle of motion in the environment.

In my paper, I want to tackle this problem from a new perspective. Firstly, I shall argue that scholars in their analyses of Aristotelian self-motion tend to overlook a crucially important passage, namely Phys. VIII, 4, where Aristotle describes a kind of internal dichotomy in animals between what is said to be ‘the mover’ of a thing and its ‘moved part.’ I shall attempt to demonstrate that this division is directly relevant for our understanding of Aristotelian self-motion. Specifically, I will analyse what exactly Aristotle means by ‘subjects’ that move and are moved (κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται) in virtue of something else. Furthermore, I propose that this dichotomy (inherent in every living being) is most likely an elaboration of Plato’s ideas about the soul and its division.

I shall, accordingly, (1) focus on the section for Plato’s Republic (435c) where he distinguishes three parts of the soul, each responsible for different types of human behaviour (2) and show how this division of the soul might be relevant for Aristotle’s argument. In particular, I shall consider the two illustrations Plato employs in connection with this tripartition: the spinning top and the man who is moving just one part of his body. I will, then, outline how this discussion is reminiscent of Phys. VIII, 4.

Finally, I will show how the Platonic notion of tripartition may help explain what Aristotle meant by ‘subjects’ involved in the activity of motion; and how these ‘subjects’ are directly relevant for the debate about self-motion in Aristotle.
Meteora as pathe

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From a contemporary point of view, a meteorologist is expected to deal with atmospheric events. Nowadays, meteorology is understood as the science which deals with the explanations of meteorological phenomena—with an emphasis upon weather prediction. Aristotle’s *Meteorologica* (*Meteor.*.) too is concerned with the investigation of the meteorological phenomena. As the title suggests, *Meteor.* is an attempt to give a λόγος (account) of things which are ‘elevated’ or else, ‘raised from the ground’ (*meteora*). In *Meteor.* Aristotle discusses atmospheric events as well as matters of a more general interest viz., some geological or astronomical phenomena like earthquakes and milky way, respectively. The subject-matter of this inquiry, as Aristotle puts it, is ‘what all predecessors called meteorology’; yet, this is not at all clear. However, already in chapter I of the first book of *Meteor.* Aristotle provides more information regarding the nature of the *meteora*. He argues that the meteorological phenomena (which we nowadays naturally call events, for him and his meteorological study) are in fact affections (πάθη). In the framework of the present paper, the aim is to investigate into the nature of those affections. This paper also aspires to shed some light on the role of aesthesis in acquiring knowledge of such affections.
Approaches to Aristotle’s logical syntax usually focus on the structure of assertoric or modal categorical propositions (i.e., modal or non-modal universal or particular propositions of subject-predicate form). These kinds of propositions have a special status because they figure in the assertoric and modal syllogistic, which occupies the first 22 chapters of the *Prior Analytics*. Consequently, they deserve the name of “syllogistic propositions”. The syntax of other kinds of propositions—such as singular or temporalized propositions—is frequently overlooked because they do not figure in the syllogistic. However, Aristotle consecrates many passages outside the chapters of the syllogistic to the analysis of such “non-syllogistic propositions”, as I want to call them. This paper explores the features common to all predicative Aristotelian propositions (PAPs), syllogistic or non-syllogistic. Indeed, it will be shown that there is one logical structure common to all PAPs. Accordingly, I shall pursue the following question: what is the logical structure underlying PAPs?

PAPs are concatenations of two terms with one copula. Terms are non-logical constants, copulas are logical constants. Terms are singular or universal, predicative or non-predicative. Singular terms are true of exactly one thing, universal terms are true of more than one thing. Predicative terms predicate something and may be predicated something of (and may therefore occur in subject or in predicate position), non-predicative terms may only be predicated something of (and may therefore only occur in subject position). Copulas indicate the formal properties of quality, quantity, and modality. We may differentiate altogether 36 copulas, this number being the product of the number of qualities (2: affirmative, negative), quantities (3: indefinite, universal, particular), and modalities (6: assertoric-present, assertoric-past, assertoric-future, necessary, one-sided possible, two-sided possible). Copulas serve to syntactically link two terms and to specify the relation between them, i.e., how exactly one term does or does not belong to another. All in all, we may differentiate 48 types of PAPs.

The goal of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of Aristotle’s logical syntax. In particular, it aims to pave the way towards a more coherent and systematic picture of the structure of PAPs as discussed not only in the syllogistic but also elsewhere in Aristotle’s extant works.
Heraclitus at the Doctor’s
The Cosmology of the pseudo-Hippocratic *On Regimen* and its Context

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In my presentation, I propose a new interpretation of a difficult passage from the pseudo-Hippocratic treatise *On Regimen* (I,3), which ostensibly describes a kind of two-element cosmology and element cycle.

The passage is interesting not just from the perspective of medical history but even more so from a historico-philosophical standpoint. In it, Regimen’s anonymous author outlines the material composition of human and animal bodies. According to him, they are made up of two basic stuffs – fire and water which, in turn, are engaged in a cycle of periodic domination and retreat. As such, fire and water behave like typical elements of an Ionian (e.g. Empedoclean) cosmology, yet, at the same time they are paradoxically described in terms of mixture (presumably of the Anaxagorean type), i.e. fire and water are said to contain each other’s properties – fire having some hugrotes and water – some dryness. As for their cycle, their periodic domination can also be read as an oscillation of a mixture-continuum. Furthermore, this whole system, as I shall argue, seems to be based on an astronomical model: specifically, the path of fire mimics the oscillation the two tropics.

This peculiar combination of contradictory features has long attracted scholarly attention, however, most of it has been focused on finding the Presocratic origins of this theory (it is typically attributed to either Archelaus or Empedocles or both). Yet, as current research – cf. [Bartoš 2015], [Schluderer 2019] – rightly acknowledges, the passage needs to be approached form both a historical and a synchronic angle.

Bearing this in mind, in my paper, I offer two suggestions: (1) Contrary to most scholarly assumptions, Regimen’s cycle can be directly traced back to Heraclitus fragment B31DK of which I shall provide a new reading. (2) I will argue that Regimen represents the earliest recorded attempt to grapple with the difficulties of Heraclitus’ cosmology; and that the author’s peculiar notion of elements and cycles are best understood as an attempt to restate and systematize it in contemporary (4th century) terms. In turn, Regimen may shed light on some difficult aspects of Heraclitean cosmology and metaphysics: such as the role of fire in his system, his notion of elements and their properties, and his ideas about elemental change.
In a passage of the *Timaeus* where the liver’s physiological constitution and function are described (*Tim. 71A-72A*), the word “appearance” occurs many times. The precise meaning of this term is far from being clear and the role played by the notion of appearance within Timaeus’ description is a matter of dispute among scholars. In this paper I will try to account for this controversial terminological usage and to offer an overall reading of the passage.

First, I will go through the passage, present its context and argumentative goals, and focus on the problematic nature of appearances. The main questions which I would like to raise are: what does it mean for appetite to be responsive to “images and appearances”? How does this process occur? And what do these images and appearances actually amount to?

Secondly, I will try to answer these questions by referring to two other texts: *Phlb. 41C5-42A4* and *Resp. X.583B-586E* (with a particular focus on 584A-586C). Although they are different with respect to their argumentative aims, both passages suggest a correlation between the experiencing of “appearances”, taken as instances of mis-perception or optical illusions, and that of a specific set of pleasures, namely those that have to do with bodily needs and irrational appetites. I will suggest that, given that such a correlation might be detected also in the *Timaeus* passage, this could provide a key to interpreting the notion of appearance employed there.
Plotinus’ notion of *intellect* unites many different areas of philosophical thought. First and foremost, *intellect* figures as the core explanatory device in Plotinus’ epistemology. As such, the investigation into *intellect*’s structure and working provides us with a comprehensible understanding of what it is for Plotinus to think and, as the goal of every thought, what it is to think truly about being, i.e. to have knowledge. Moreover, Plotinus is following a long tradition of ancient thought according to which the act of thinking is not different form the act of being itself. Hence, since *intellect* figured as the main ingredient in Plotinus’ notions of thought and knowledge, it will also provide us with the basic ideas of his ontology.

Therefore, in this talk I wish to view Plotinus’ notion of true or intelligible being from the viewpoint of its basic context, the activity of thought. For this reason, I will present a close reading of the main parts of *Ennead V 5* in which Plotinus deals with the issue whether the objects of *intellect*’s thought are to be considered inside *intellect* or outside. As we will see, Plotinus opts for the first alternative which we call the *internality thesis*. In following his main arguments, we will focus on the self-awareness that Plotinus attributes to *intellect* and which constitutes his main reason for opting for the *internality thesis*. This viewpoint, thereby, is far from being private. Quite contrarily, Plotinus describes one’s intellectual grasp of being as the ascent of the finite self to its true and proper form – namely *intellect* itself. The experience of being engaged in intellectual thought, therefore, is not a non-objective kind of awareness, but rather the self-reflection of a subject which has become *intellect*, i.e. the subject of objective thought in general.

Plotinus’ description of this self-reflection focuses on the way *intellect* comes to understand itself as being capable of objective thought. In this context, I want to scrutinize two main topics of Plotinus’ discussion: 1) How does *intellect* differ from sense-perception? And more precisely: how does it differ from sense-perception regarding its self-awareness as objective? 2) In what sense shall we understand Plotinus’ famous claim that intelligible being was always “inside” *intellect*? My claim is that we can best make sense of Plotinus’ train of thought in *Enn. V 5* if we consider *intellect*’s self-reflection as a reflection on the way we grasp truths about being. Since Plotinus argues explicitly that *intellect*, in opposition to sense-
perception, can never fail to grasp the truth, my main task will consist in reconstructing intellectual thought as a self-validating activity of the mind; in doing so, I will show that the unity of what is grasped by that activity depends on the logical features of the act of intellectually grasping a thought. Hence, the unity of intelligible being, considered as what is internal to intellectual thought, depends upon the way intellect grasps its object, i.e. on the self-validating nature of that kind of thought.
In the works of Sextus Empiricus the discussion of the sign plays a prominent role. According to the Stoics, a sign is an evident antecedent that is revelatory of the non-evident consequent of its conditional. Sextus aims to induce suspension of judgement on whether there can be such means of proceeding from what is known to what is unknown. During his discussion, he raises many objections to the thesis that there are signs and then gives dogmatic arguments for that thesis.

One of these arguments occurs at SE M 8.275f. It proceeds from a statement of two differences between humans and non-human animals to the claim that humans have a concept of consequence and then to the claims that humans have a concept of the sign. Thus, it is supposed to follow from human nature that there are signs. Sextus complains that his opponents presuppose a providential constitution of human nature and, thus, presuppose something that is even more in need of proof. The reference to providence identifies this argument as Stoic.

I intend to discuss whether and/or how this argument establishes its conclusion. The overall issue is whether the concept of consequence in this argument, and any concept for that matter, is innate or acquired.